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Abstract
This Essay examines aspects of the free movement of workers and the issues concerning the
content and impact of the introduction of citizenship of the European Union (”EU” or “Union”).
This Essay draws from seven years of opinions from Advocate General Slynn, which were written
during a highly formative period in the development of Community law. Defining who is a worker
and examining the benefits of having and retaining this worker status remain as important today as
they were in the late 1980s, when relevant seminal case law of the Court of Justice was established.
In many of those cases, Gordon Slynn was the Advocate General. The advent of formal recognition
of Union citizenship in the Treaty of Maastricht has not obviated the need to consider the range of
rights which flow from such citizenship when an individual is in a Member State other than that of
his nationality. These rights still, though to a lesser extent than before, turn on economic activity,
or a close link to economic activity. That makes citizenship of the Union, at least to some extent,
an incomplete form of citizenship.

REVISITING FREE MOVEMENT OF WORKERS
Robin C. A. White
INTRODUCTION
Gordon Slynn was Advocate General at the Court of Justice
of the European Communities (“Court” or “ECJ”) from 1981 to
1988 and a judge at the Court from 1988 to 1992. The single
collegiate judgments of the Court of Justice1 mean that we have
to discern judicial attitudes and approaches, as far as we can,
from extra-judicial writings. But advocates general speak for
themselves, and we have seven years of opinions from Advocate
General Slynn during a highly formative period in the
development of Community law on which to draw.2
To a certain extent, some aspects of the free movement of
workers now play second fiddle to issues concerning the content
and impact of the introduction of citizenship of the European
Union (“Union” or “Community”).3 Nevertheless, a sharp
distinction is still drawn between those who are economically
active and those who are not. The former are citizens of the
Union with the strongest transnational rights, while the latter,
when they move from the Member State of their nationality to
* Professor of Law, and member of the Centre for European Law and Integration,
in the School of Law, The University of Leicester. The author holds a part-time judicial
appointment as a Deputy Judge of the Upper Tribunal; in so far as any comments
overlap with his judicial function, the views expressed are purely personal.
1. See MARGARET HORSPOOL & MATTHEW HUMPHREYS, EUROPEAN UNION LAW 103
(2006).
2. Of particular relevance to this Article are the opinions in the following cases:
Belgium v. Humbel, Case 263/86, [1988] E.C.R. 5365; Brown v. Sec’y of State for
Scotland, Case 197/86, [1988] E.C.R. 3205; Lair v. Universität Hannover, Case 197/86,
[1988] E.C.R. 3161; Blaizot v. Univ. of Liège, Case 24/86, [1988] E.C.R. 379; Barra v.
Belgium & City of Liège, Case 309/85, [1988] E.C.R. 355; Commission v. Belgium, Case
293/85, [1988] E.C.R. 305; Kempf v. Staatssecretaris van Justitie, Case 139/85, [1986]
E.C.R. 1741; Gravier v. City of Liège, Case 293/83, [1985] E.C.R. 593; Morson & Jhanjan
v. The Netherlands, Joined Cases 35–36/82, [1982] E.C.R. 3723; and Levin v.
Staatssecretaris van Justitie, Case 53/81, [1982] E.C.R. 1035.
3. Since December 1, 2009, when the Lisbon Treaty came into force, the term
“European Community” has been replaced with the term “European Union.” However,
this Essay uses both “Community” and “Union” to refer to what is now the European
Union.
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another Member State, can be seen as potential burdens on
public funds and as unwelcome intruders. For these reasons,
defining who is a worker and examining the benefits of having
and retaining this worker status remain as important today as
they were in the late 1980s, when some seminal case law of the
Court of Justice was established. In many of those cases, Gordon
Slynn was the Advocate General.
The advent of formal recognition of Union citizenship in
the Treaty of Maastricht4 has not obviated the need to consider
the range of rights which flow from such citizenship when an
individual is in a Member State other than that of his nationality.
These rights still, though to a lesser extent than before, turn on
economic activity, or a close link to economic activity. That
makes citizenship of the Union, at least to some extent, an
incomplete form of citizenship.
I.

DEFINING WHO IS A WORKER

In one of its early decisions, the Hoekstra case,5 the ECJ ruled
that the definition of “worker” was not dependent on any
national classification of workers and self-employed people, but
was a Community law concept. It also recognized that persons
could retain their status as workers though not actually
employed, as, for example, when they were ill, or had retired
from employment.6 Levin7 gave further substance to the
definition of worker. In Levin, Gordon Slynn was Advocate
General. The case concerned a British national living in the
Netherlands with her South African husband.8 She had worked
4. Treaty on European Union, July 29, 1992, 1992 O.J. C 191/1.
5. See Hoekstra v. Bestuur der Bedrijfsvereniging voor Detailhandel en Ambachten,
Case 75/63, [1964] E.C.R. 177.
6. The latter point was explicitly covered by article 48(3)(d) of the EEC Treaty. See
Treaty Establishing the European Economic Community art. 48(3)(d), at 72, Mar. 25,
1957, 298 U.N.T.S. 11 [hereinafter EEC Treaty]. Subsequently it was covered by article
39(3)(d) of the Consolidated Version of the Treaty Establishing the European
Community. Consolidated Version of the Treaty Establishing the European Community
art. 39(3)(d), 2006 O.J. C 321 E/37, at 29 [hereinafter EC Treaty]. Now, following the
entry into force of the Treaty of Lisbon, it is covered by article 45(3)(d) of the Treaty on
the Functioning of the European Union. Consolidated Version of the Treaty on the
Functioning of the European Union art. 45(3)(d), 2008 O.J. C 115/47, at 51
[hereinafter TFEU].
7. Levin v. Staatssecretaris van Justitie, Case 53/81, [1982] E.C.R. 1035.
8. Opinion of Advocate General Slynn, Levin, [1982] E.C.R. 1035, 1055.
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regularly as a chambermaid in various hotels in Amsterdam, and
was refused a residence permit, for which Community law
provided.9 When she asked for the decision to be reconsidered,
she was working part-time as a chambermaid for around twenty
hours a week.10 Reconsideration, however, did not result in the
granting of a permit. Advocate General Slynn was of the opinion
that, under articles 2 and 3 of the European Economic
Community Treaty (“EEC Treaty”),11 a person must be engaged
in “an activity of an economic nature” to be considered a
worker.12 There was nothing in the scheme of the EEC Treaty
which required the interpretation of worker to be restricted to a
person who earns a particular wage or works for a certain
number of hours per week. Nor is the presence or lack of private
means to supplement the earnings to a certain level a relevant
issue. For Advocate General Slynn, however, the person must be
moving to another Member State for the purpose of the
employment, though there is no requirement to show that that
purpose is the dominant purpose.13 The Advocate General
proposed that the Court answer the referred questions in the
following terms:
A national of one Member State who, on the territory of
another Member State undertakes paid work under a
contract of employment, qualifies as a “worker” within the
meaning of Article 48 of the EEC Treaty and its
implementing legislation, and is entitled accordingly to be
issued with a residence permit of the kind mentioned in
Article 4 of Council Directive 68/360 even though such
employment is so limited in extent as to yield an income
lower than that which is regarded in that State as the
minimum necessary to enable the costs of subsistence to be
met . . . .

....

9. At the time, Council Directive 68/360 required “abolition of restrictions on the
movement and residence of nationals in Member States and their families . . . .” Id. at
1057 (referring to Council Directive No. 68/360, art. 4, 1968 O.J. Eng. Spec. Ed., at
485).
10. Id. at 1055.
11. Id. at 1058.
12. Id.
13. Id. at 1060–61.
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The right of such a national to admission into and residence
in the Member State pursuant to Article 48 and its
implementing legislation is dependent on its being shown
that the work in the Member State is a genuine and
substantial purpose of such national although it need not be
the chief purpose.14

The ECJ ruled that one’s motivation for moving was only
relevant insofar as the person was moving to pursue “an effective
and genuine activity” as an employed person.15 The Court also
ruled that “the exceptions to effective and genuine activities were
those ‘activities on such a small scale as to be regarded as purely
marginal and ancillary.’”16 This requirement might be regarded
as a sufficiency test regarding the nature of the work being
undertaken.
The ECJ then added a formal test to the sufficiency test in
the Lawrie-Blum case.17 To determine that a person is employed
for the purposes of what is now article 45 of the Treaty on the
Functioning of the European Union (“TFEU”), the Court must
answer three questions affirmatively:
1. Is the person obliged to work for another?
2. Is the work done for monetary reward or payment in
kind?
3. Is the person subject to the direction and control of
another?18
The broad scope of the test established in the Levin case
resulted in a later reference in the Kempf case.19 In Levin, the
plaintiff had argued that the couple had private means which
enabled them to meet their living expenses.20 In Kempf, the
question was whether a person would be a worker under
Community law if his or her earnings, which were below
subsistence level, needed to be supplemented by public
assistance.21 Again, Gordon Slynn was the Advocate General. He
14. Id. at 1061–62.
15. Levin, [1982] E.C.R. 1035, ¶¶ 21–22.
16. Id. ¶ 17.
17. Lawrie-Blum v. Land Baden-Württemberg, Case 66/85, [1986] E.C.R. 2121.
18. Id. ¶ 13. The exchange of work for payment in kind was established in
Steymann v. Staatssecretaris van Justitie, Case 196/87, [1988] E.C.R. 6159.
19. Kempf v. Staatssecretaris van Justitie, Case 139/85, [1986] E.C.R. 1741.
20. See Levin, [1982] E.C.R. 1035.
21. See Kempf, [1986] E.C.R. 1741.
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had no doubt that there should be no restriction imposed on
acquiring worker status under the EEC Treaty by the mere fact
that the person was dependent upon a financial supplement
from social security benefits to reach what the Member State
regarded as a subsistence income.22 He did, however, concede
that recourse to public funds could be taken into account in
determining whether the work being undertaken was “purely
marginal and ancillary” rather than “genuine and effective”
work.23 The Court in Kempf followed the opinion of the Advocate
General.24
The decisions in the Levin and Kempf cases remain key
authorities on the definition of who is a worker under what is
now article 45 TFEU.25 In the Kempf case, the Court said:
The Court has consistently held that freedom of movement
for workers forms one of the foundations of the Community.
The provisions laying down that fundamental freedom and,
more particularly, the terms ‘worker’ and ‘activity as an
employed person’ defining the sphere of application of
those freedoms must be given a broad interpretation in that
regard, whereas exceptions to and derogations from the
principle of freedom of movement for workers must be
interpreted strictly.26

Similar statements and references to the Levin case can be found
in more modern authorities.27
II. BENEFITS OF WORKER STATUS
The benefits of establishing worker status under article 45
TFEU28 are manifold. They include: freedom from immigration
control, considerable protection against deportation, a right to
remain in the Member State of residence upon finishing work
22. See id. at 1744.
23. Id.
24. See Kempf, [1986] E.C.R. at 1747, ¶ 16.
25. TFEU, supra note 6, art. 45, 2008 O.J. C 115/47; see, e.g., Petersen v.
Arbeitsmarktservice Niederösterrreich, Case C-228/07, [2008] E.C.R. I-6989; NinniOrasche v. Bundesminister für Wissenschaft, Verkehr & Kunst, Case C-413/01, [2003]
E.C.R. I-13,187; and Raulin v. Neth. Ministry of Educ. & Sci., Case C-357/89, [1992]
E.C.R. I-1027.
26. Kempf, [1986] E.C.R. 1741, ¶ 13.
27. See, e.g., cases cited supra note 25.
28. TFEU, supra note 6, art. 45, 2008 O.J. C 115/47.
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either as a result of retirement or disablement, entitlement to
equality of treatment with nationals of the Member State of
residence, equal entitlement with nationals to social and tax
advantages widely interpreted, rights to bring other members of
your family to join you, and a right to reasoned decisions
affecting any of these listed rights.29
Some of the enumerated rights are more generous than
those accorded to workers within the Member State of residence.
This gave rise to claims that if Community law provided such
rights, then national law should be obliged to grant similar rights
to nationals of that Member State who had not exercised their
rights to move to another Member State under Community law.
Once again the Advocate General in one of the seminal cases was
Gordon Slynn.30 The Morson case31 concerned the claims of the
mothers of two Dutch nationals of Surinamese origin, who were
living and working in the Netherlands to secure resident permits.
The mothers did not have Dutch nationality. Morson and
Jhanjan applied for residence permits under the Community law
provisions as the mothers of workers of Dutch nationality in
order to enable them to stay in the Netherlands following a visit
to see their children.32 The Dutch immigration authorities took
the view that Community law did not apply, since the Dutch
nationals had never exercised their rights to move and work in
another Member State.33 The provisions of the relevant
secondary legislation were, it was argued, for the benefit of those
exercising their rights of free movement, and were designed to
avoid obstacles to such movement.34 The problem arose because
the provisions of the Community law rules were more generous
29. For an elaboration of these rights, see ROBIN C.A. WHITE, WORKERS,
ESTABLISHMENT AND SERVICES IN THE EUROPEAN UNION 138–88 (2004). See also Council
Regulation on Freedom of Movement for Workers Within the Community, No. 1612/68,
1968 O.J. L 257/2, O.J. Eng. Spec. Ed. 1968, at 475; Council Directive on the Rights of
Citizens of the Union and Their Family Members to Move and Reside Freely Within the
Territory of the Member States, No. 2004/38, 2004 O.J. L 158/77, corrected version in
2004 O.J. L 229/35, corrected by 2005 O.J. L 197/34, corrected by 2007 O.J. L 204/28
[hereinafter Citizenship Directive] (subsequent citations will be to the full text English
version at 2004 O.J. L 229/35, unless otherwise noted).
30. Opinion of Advocate General Slynn, Morson v. The Netherlands, Joined Cases
35–36/82, [1982] E.C.R. 3723, 3742.
31. Morson, [1982] E.C.R. 3723.
32. Id. ¶ 2.
33. See id. ¶ 18.
34. See id. ¶ 15.
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than the national immigration rules on bringing parents from
other countries to join their children as their dependants. The
Advocate General noted that there was nothing to prevent
individuals pleading rights arising under Community law against
the Member State of which they are a national, but the claims
must be ones arising because Community law is engaged. Here,
that was not the case. He concluded:
In the present case there is no suggestion or indication that
the workers in question have ever exercised or sought or
intended to assert their rights under the Treaty. They have
not been employed in another Member State. Accordingly it
seems to me that their relatives cannot say that they have any
rights under Community law to install themselves with their
children.35

The ECJ came to the same conclusion in its judgment,
though it drafted its ruling in slightly different terms.36 The line
of cases in which the ECJ has ruled that a Member State is free to
treat its own nationals less favorably than is required by
Community law to treat similarly situated nationals of other
Member States has been labeled “reverse discrimination” cases.37
It applies where a matter is wholly internal to a Member State.
The Court of Justice has, however, not needed much persuading
to determine that a situation is one in which there is a factor
linking a person with a situation governed by Community law.38
The issue of reverse discrimination will be further discussed in
Part IV.B.
Retaining worker status after having been employed carries
a passport to equal treatment with nationals in relation to a
whole raft of potential benefits. One battleground has been
entitlement to financial support to meet living expenses as a
student. Gordon Slynn was Advocate General in the Gravier
case,39 which established that Community competence in this
area was limited. There was a common approach to vocational
training, and the prohibition of discrimination on grounds of
nationality contained in article 7 of the EEC Treaty meant that
35.
36.
37.
38.

Opinion of Advocate General Slynn, Morson, [1982] E.C.R. 3723, 3742.
See Morson, [1982] E.C.R. 3723, ¶ 10.
Id. ¶¶ 12–15.
For a detailed discussion of the question of reverse discrimination, see ALINA
TRYFONIDOU, REVERSE DISCRIMINATION IN EC LAW (2009).
39. Gravier v. City of Liège, Case 293/83, [1985] E.C.R. 593.
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tuition fees charged to students pursuing vocational training
must be the same for nationals of all the Member States.40 It was
subsequently established in Humbel41 that a course year of
secondary education could be part of vocational training if it
could be said to be part of an overall body of instruction leading
to qualification for a particular profession, trade, or employment,
but that state-provided education was not a service within what
was then article 49 of the EEC Treaty.42
A series of cases in 1988, in which the Advocate General was
Gordon Slynn, took up the issue of access to financial support for
studies as an entitlement arising under Community law. The
starting point was the judgment in Gravier, which meant that
those arguing for a Community law entitlement to financial
support for their studies could not simply rely on the prohibition
of discrimination in matters within the scope of the EEC Treaty
as the basis for their claim. The Gravier case had established that
equality of access to vocational training required equal treatment
of all nationals of the Member States only in relation to tuition
fees; any system of educational grants fell outside the scope of
Community law per se.43 In both Lair44 and Brown,45 the
individuals were arguing that they were workers who had ceased
work in order to undertake vocational training. In such
circumstances, they argued, they continued to qualify as workers
under the EEC Treaty and were entitled to financial support for
their studies since this was a benefit falling within article 7 of
Regulation 1612/68.46

40. See EEC Treaty, supra note 6, art. 7; see also Barra v. Belgium & City of Liège,
Case 309/85, [1988] E.C.R. 355; Blaizot v. Univ. of Liège, Case 24/86, [1988] E.C.R. 379
(elaborating on the concept of vocational training); Commission v. Belgium, Case
293/85, [1988] E.C.R. 305 (disagreeing with Advocate General Slynn on the
admissibility of an enforcement action against Belgium concerning tuition fees).
41. Belgium v. Humbel, Case 263/86, [1988] E.C.R. 5365. The Advocate General in
this case was again Gordon Slynn.
42. See id. ¶¶ 13, 20; see also EEC Treaty, supra note 6, art. 49, at 56 (subsequently
article 9 EC, and now article 56 TFEU).
43. Gravier, [1985] E.C.R. 593, ¶ 26. This remained the case until the judgment in
The Queen, ex rel. Bidar v. London Borough of Ealing, Case C-209/03, [2005] E.C.R. I2119.
44. Lair v. Universität Hannover, Case 39/86, [1988] E.C.R. 3161.
45. Brown v. Sec’y of State for Scot., Case 197/86, [1988] E.C.R. 3205.
46. See Brown, [1988] E.C.R. 3205, ¶¶ 3–5; Lair, [1988] E.C.R. 3161, ¶ 2; see also
Council Regulation No. 1612/68, supra note 29, O.J. Eng. Spec. Ed. 1968, at 475.
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The situations of the two claimants, however, were different.
Sylvie Lair was a French national who had been living in
Germany since at least the start of 1979.47 She had been
employed there for two-and-a-half years, but thereafter had a
sporadic record of employment, unemployment, and retraining.
In 1984 she started a degree course in Romance and Germanic
languages and literature at the University of Hanover.48 She
applied for an educational grant, which the university refused to
award on the grounds that, as a non-German national, she had
not been engaged in full-time employment in Germany for at
least five years.49 The Advocate General concluded that the facts
before him indicated that Sylvie Lair was someone who had gone
to and was in Germany as a “genuine worker economically
integrated into the host State.”50 The crucial question was
whether she had ceased to be a worker for the purposes of
Community law when she started her university course. Advocate
General Slynn interpreted article 7(3) of Regulation 1612/68 to
mean that a person who ceases work and undertakes what the
provision described as “training in vocational training schools
and retaining centres” did not thereby lose their worker status.51
But article 7(2) is also relevant in providing for equal access to
“social and tax advantages.”52 The Advocate General reached an
important conclusion:
The question is thus whether the training sought here is in a
vocational training school. I have come to the conclusion
that “vocational training” can take place in a university. . . . If
that is right a university in my view is pro tanto a vocational
training school and I see no valid reason to apply Article
7(3) to only some institutions of education where vocational
training is given. There is no magic in the word “school”:
within a university the word is not uncommonly found as
being a part of the university as in “law school” or “medical
school.”53

47.
48.
49.
50.
51.
52.

See Lair, [1988] E.C.R. 3161, ¶ 3.
See id.
See id. ¶ 6.
Opinion of Advocate General Slynn, Lair, [1988] E.C.R. 3161, 3184.
See id.
Council Regulation No. 1612/68, supra note 29, O.J. Eng. Spec. Ed. 1968, at

475.
53. Opinion of Advocate General Slynn, Lair, [1988] E.C.R. 3161, 3186.
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Consequently, he was able to conclude:
A national of one Member State who moves to another
Member State and takes up employment in the capacity of a
worker is entitled to an award of an educational grant for
maintenance subject to the same criteria and on the same
terms as national workers: (a) in respect of general
education as a social advantage under Article 7(2) of
Regulation No 1612/68; (b) in respect of training in
vocational schools under Article 7(3) of that regulation.54

The ECJ largely followed this reasoning in concluding that
(a) an educational grant to enable a person to pursue university
studies leading to a professional qualification is a social
advantage within article 7(2) of Regulation 1612/68; (b) a
person who has been a worker who undertakes university studies
leading to a professional qualification is to be regarded as
retaining worker status and is entitled to equal treatment with
nationals in access to such educational grants, provided that
there is a link between the previous occupational activity and the
studies in question; and (c) a Member State cannot make access
to benefits falling within article 7(2) of Regulation 1612/68
conditional upon a minimum period of prior occupational
activity on the territory of that Member State.55
Stephen Brown’s circumstances were somewhat different.
He had a French mother and a British father, and held both
French and British nationalities.56 In 1965, the family moved to
France, where Stephen had been educated. In 1983, he secured a
place at the University of Cambridge to study electrical
engineering on a degree course starting in the autumn of 1984.57
Stephen worked in employment described as “pre-university
industrial training,” which included a twelve week inductory
course followed by work as an employee of the participating
firm.58 Stephen’s participation in this scheme was patently a
success, since he was awarded a sponsorship by the employer.
This entitled him to a sum of money each term, as well as paid
employment in university vacations to increase his industrial

54.
55.
56.
57.
58.

Id. at 3189.
See Lair, [1988] E.C.R. 3161, ¶¶ 24–44.
Brown v. Sec’y of State for Scot., Case 197/86, [1988] E.C.R. 3205, ¶ 3.
Id.
Id.; see also Opinion of Advocate General Slynn, Brown, [1988] E.C.R. 3205.
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experience. The University of Cambridge did not require its
incoming students to have undertaken industrial experience
prior to the start of the course, but there was a required eight
week industrial placement which formed part of the course at the
end of the second year of studies.59 Stephen applied for an
educational grant to the Scottish Education Department, which
refused to award the grant because Stephen did not meet the
conditions of entitlement. First, he had not been ordinarily
resident in the British Isles for three years ending on August 31,
1984.60 Second, although he had been resident in another
Member State for the requisite period, he could not meet both of
the following conditions: (a) he had not been employed in
Scotland for nine of the twelve months prior to August 31, 1984,
and (b) he was not seeking the educational grant in respect of a
course at a vocational training establishment.61 There was a
further condition that, in such cases, the applicant must have
entered the United Kingdom wholly or mainly for the purpose of
taking up or seeking employment. Third, although he had been
resident in another Member State and was the child of nationals
of a Member State, neither of his parents was employed in
Scotland on the qualifying date, in this case June 30, 1984, nor
had they been employed in Scotland for an aggregate period of
one year in the three years prior to June 30, 1984.62 Brown
challenged the refusal to award an educational grant.63
In response to questions raised by the Scottish court, the
Advocate General first concluded that the Cambridge degree
program constituted vocational training under Community law in
that it formed an integral part of the overall training required for
recognition as a chartered engineer.64 The core question was
whether the industrial experience Brown had undertaken, which
took the form of employment prior to his studies, enabled him to
secure access to an educational grant as a worker. The Advocate
General identified the central question as:
In my opinion for the purposes of applying for a student
grant under Article 7 [of Regulation 1612/68] he must show
59.
60.
61.
62.
63.
64.

Opinion of Advocate General Slynn, Brown, [1988] E.C.R. 3205.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Brown, [1988] E.C.R. 3205, ¶ 2
Id.
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that he does so genuinely in his capacity as a worker and he
must be in the Member State in such capacity and for the
purpose of being a worker.65

The Advocate General then gave a strong steer to the national
court by noting that a person undertaking employment linked to
industrial experience, primarily to better prepare themselves for
a degree program, is not someone whose presence in the host
Member State is for the primary purpose of employment. The
work is “ancillary to the course of study.”66 Once again the ECJ
largely followed the opinion of its Advocate General.
A common thread which runs through the opinions of
Advocate General Slynn in the cases considered in this Article is
the purpose of the activities undertaken by the person seeking to
rely upon Community law to secure some entitlement arising
under Community law. This enabled him to draw a distinction in
drafting his opinions in Lair and Brown. Sylvie Lair had achieved
economic integration into the host Member State through her
pattern of employment, whereas Stephen Brown had not. He was
simply preparing himself effectively for a Cambridge degree
program. The distinction can be a narrow one; one might say
that Sylvie Lair was an economic mover, whereas Stephen Brown
was a student mover. As we shall see, such distinctions continue
to hold significance in an era in which the umbrella of
citizenship of the Union covers all nationals of the Member
States. However, amendments to the EEC Treaty coupled with
the advent of citizenship have produced a situation in which the
ECJ, in its 2005 Bidar case, ruled that financial support for studies
did now fall within the scope of the EC Treaty.67
III. THE ADVENT OF CITIZENSHIP
Articles 8 to 8c of the EEC Treaty as amended by the Treaty
of Maastricht contained provisions formally establishing
citizenship of the Union.68 Prior to this, many scholars argued for
65. Id. at 3232.
66. Id.
67. Bidar v. London Borough of Ealing, Case C-209/03, [2005] E.C.R. I-2119, ¶ 31.
For a discussion of the case, see Oxana Golynker, Student Loans: The European Concept of
Social Justice According to Bidar, 31 EUR. L. REV. 390 (2006).
68. Consolidated Version of the Treaty Establishing the European Community arts.
8–8c, 1992 O.J. C 224/1, at 11.
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the need for a model of citizenship to make the benefits for
individuals of participation in the European integration project
more apparent.69 The provisions inserted by the Treaty of
Maastricht subsequently became articles 17 to 22 of the EC
Treaty,70 and are now articles 20 to 25 of the TFEU.71
One of the most significant cases in recent years on the free
movement of persons is the Baumbast case.72 The case concerned
two families, but exposition of the circumstances of one of them
is sufficient for understanding how the ECJ developed its case
law. Mr. Baumbast was a German national, and his wife was a
Colombian national. They had two daughters.73 Mr. Baumbast
had been a worker employed in the United Kingdom.74 He
followed this employment with a period of self-employment, and
held a five-year residence permit under the Community
secondary legislation in operation at the time. When his selfemployment came to an end, he obtained employment with a
German company, but his work was abroad in China and
Lesotho. The family continued to live in the United Kingdom,
where his daughters went to school. The family had never
claimed any social security benefits in the United Kingdom, and
had comprehensive medical insurance in Germany, where they
travelled from time to time for medical treatment.75 The
Secretary of State refused to renew Mr. Baumbast’s residence
permit on the grounds that he was no longer a worker, and
refused the applications of his wife and children for indefinite
leave to remain in the United Kingdom.76 Mr. Baumbast
challenged the decisions, and questions were referred to the
ECJ.77 The Court used the concepts of citizenship of the Union
and the rights set out in article 18 of the EC Treaty (now TFEU
69. See SIOFRA O’LEARY, THE EVOLVING CONCEPT OF COMMUNITY CITIZENSHIP,
FROM THE FREE MOVEMENT OF PERSONS TO UNION CITIZENSHIP 3–31 (1996); see also
MASSIMO CONDINANZI ET AL., CITIZENSHIP OF THE UNION AND FREEDOM OF MOVEMENT
OF PERSONS 1 (2008); Francis Jacobs, Citizenship of the European Union—A Legal Analysis,
13 EUR. L.J. 591 (2007).
70. EC Treaty, supra note 6, arts. 17–22, 2006 O.J. C 321 E, at 49–51.
71. TFEU, supra note 6, arts. 20–25, 2008 O.J. C. 115, at 56–58.
72. Baumbast v. Sec’y of State for the Home Dep’t, Case C-413/99, [2002] E.C.R. I7091.
73. Id. ¶ 16.
74. Id. ¶ 18.
75. Id. ¶ 19.
76. Id. ¶ 20.
77. Id. ¶¶ 21–22.
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article 21) to fill gaps in the treaty rules and provisions in the
secondary legislation of the right to free movement. 78 The Court
said:
A citizen of the European Union who no longer enjoys a
right of residence as a migrant worker in the host Member
State can, as a citizen of the Union, enjoy there a right of
residence by direct application of Article 18(1) EC. The
exercise of that right is subject to the limitations and
conditions referred to in that provision, but the competent
authorities and, where necessary, the national courts must
ensure that those limitations and conditions are applied in
compliance with the general principles of Community law
and, in particular, the principle of proportionality.79

The ECJ has increasingly given a constitutional significance
to the economic, political, social, and other rights contained in
the treaty provisions on citizenship. The current mantra of the
ECJ is as follows:
[I]n accordance with settled case-law, citizenship of the
Union is destined to be the fundamental status of nationals
of the Member States, enabling those who find themselves in
the same situation to receive the same treatment in law
irrespective of their nationality, subject to such exceptions as
are expressly provided for . . . .80

Article 18 of the EC Treaty (now TFEU article 21) states the right
“to move and reside freely within the territory of the Member
States, subject to the limitations and conditions laid down in this
Treaty and by the measures adopted to give it effect.”81 Article 22

78. See id. ¶¶ 92–94.
79. Id. ¶ 94. The constitutional significance of the requirement to test national
conditions against the requirement of proportionality is explored in Michael Dougan,
The Constitutional Dimension to the Case Law on Union Citizenship, 31 EUR. L. REV. 613
(2006).
80. Gottwald v. Bezirkshauptmannschaft Bregenz, Case C-103/08, [2009] E.C.R. __,
[2010] C.M.L.R. 25, ¶ 23. See also Bidar v. London Borough of Ealing & Sec’y of State for
Educ. & Skills, Case C-209/03, [2005] E.C.R. I-2119, ¶ 31; Schempp v. Finanzamt
München V, Case C-403/03, [2005] E.C.R. 6421, ¶ 15; Orfanopoulos & Oliveri v. Land
Baden-Württemberg, Joined Cases C-482/01 & C-493/01, [2004] E.C.R. I-5257, ¶ 65;
Garcia Avello v. Belgium, Case C-148/02, [2003] E.C.R. 11613, ¶ 22; and Grzelcyk v.
Centre public d'aide sociale d'Ottignies-Louvain-la-Neuve, Case C-184/99, [2001] E.C.R.
I-6193, ¶ 31.
81. TFEU, supra note 6, art. 21, 2008 O.J. C. 115, at 57; EC Treaty, supra note 6, art.
18, 2006 O.J. C 321 E, at 49. The qualifying words ensure that the rights of free
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TFEU grants extended political rights to stand for and vote in
municipal elections in the Member State of residence, and in
elections to the European Parliament.82 Article 23 TFEU pools
the resources of the Member States to enable diplomatic and
consular protection to be afforded by the representation of any
Member State where the Member State of the person’s
nationality has no diplomatic or consular representation in the
country concerned.83 Article 24 TFEU extends the complaint
mechanisms available to citizens of the Union in relation to
matters falling within the scope of the Union treaties.84
The advent of citizenship of the Union coupled with
developments in the case law of the Court of Justice resulted in
the recasting of a whole raft of secondary legislation concerning
the free movement of persons into a single directive.85 The
Citizenship Directive is at one level a consolidating measure, but
is arguably much more than that in its tone and in some of its
provisions, such as the introduction of a new right of permanent
residence. The Citizenship Directive repeals and re-enacts the
provisions of nine directives and amends Regulation 1612/68.86
The existing piecemeal approach to the regulation of rights of
entry and residence has been recast in a single instrument. In
addition, the European Commission (“Commission”) has
repealed a Commission regulation. The debate is whether the
measure goes beyond consolidation and the introduction of the
new right of permanent residence. It can certainly be regarded as
presenting the rights of free movement which attach to
citizenship of the Union in a more obviously constitutional
framework than the secondary legislation it replaces. When the
Citizenship Directive is read with the provisions on citizenship
introduced by the Treaty of Maastricht, and with Regulation
1612/68 and Regulation 1408/71 on the coordination of social

movement are not an addition to the rights to be found elsewhere in the treaty and in
secondary legislation of the Community.
82. TFEU, supra note 6, art. 22, 2008 O.J. C. 115, at 57.
83. Id. art. 23, 2008 O.J. C 115, at 58.
84. Id. art. 24, 2008 O.J. C. 115, at 58.
85. Citizenship Directive, No. 2004/38, 2004 O.J. L 229/35.
86. Id. art. 38, 2004 O.J. L 229, at 48.
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security schemes,87 there is a comprehensive set of rights
attaching to citizenship of the Union.
Under the Citizenship Directive, rights of movement are set
out, which vary dependent upon the activities and degree of
integration of the citizen;88 there is a reduction on the
bureaucracy surrounding movement;89 there is a new right of
permanent residence which arises after a continuous period of
residence lasting five years in whatever capacity in another
Member State;90 there are tighter controls on the powers to
deport a national of another Member State;91 and there are
clearer rights to equality of treatment.92
Not everything is as clear as it should be, however. A report
in December 2008 by the Commission to the European
Parliament and Council indicated that no Member State had
fully transposed the requirements of the directive, and that there
was no single provision of the directive which had been fully
implemented in all the Member States.93 Some of this would
seem to be the result of ambiguities in the drafting of the
directive, and some the result of a lack of full social solidarity
among the Member States in securing in national law the rights
set out in the directive. In some cases, it would seem that
Member States have simply viewed the Citizenship Directive as an
immigration measure, when it clearly goes beyond that. The
complexity of transposing the requirements of the Citizenship
Directive into the national legal orders of the Member States can
87. Council Regulation on the Application of Social Security Schemes to Employed
Persons and to Members of Their Families Moving Within the Community, No.
1408/71, 1971 O.J. L 149/2, amended by 1997 O.J. L 28/4 (the latest official
consolidation of its provisions). The regulation has been amended on a number of
subsequent occasions, and has been replaced by Regulation No. 883/2004, 2004 O.J. L
166/1, corrected version in O.J. L 200/1 (2004), as amended, with effect from May 1,
2010.
88. Citizenship Directive, No. 2004/38, arts. 4–5, 2004 O.J. L 229, at 39.
89. Id.
90. Id. arts. 16–21, 2004 O.J. L 229, at 43–45.
91. Id. arts. 28–33, 2004 O.J. L 229/35, at 46–47.
92. Id. art. 24, 2004 O.J. L 229/35, at 45.
93. See Commission of the European Communities, The Application of Directive
2004/38/EC on the right of Citizens of the Union and Their Family Members to Move
and Reside Freely within the Territory of the Member States: Report from the
Commission to the European Parliament and the Council, COM (2008) 840/3, at 3
(December 2008); see also SERGIO CARRERA & ANAÏS FAURE ATGER, IMPLEMENTATION OF
DIRECTIVE 2004/38 IN THE CONTEXT OF EU ENLARGEMENT: A PROLIFERATION OF
DIFFERENT FORMS OF CITIZENSHIP? 1–5 (2009).
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be illustrated by developments in the context of entitlement to
social security benefits in the United Kingdom. For a number of
income-related benefits, a condition of entitlement is that the
person claiming the benefit has a “right to reside” in the United
Kingdom. The term is not defined in the relevant secondary
legislation in the national legal order, and it is readily conceded
by the Department for Work and Pensions before those courts
and tribunals in which the issue arises that the “right to reside”
may flow from entitlements under European Union law.94 The
focus is then on the United Kingdom regulations that seek to
implement the Citizenship Directive, and on the proper
interpretation of some of the case law of the ECJ. The result has
been at least five references to the ECJ on the interpretation and
application of European Union law.95
There is considerable discussion in the literature on
whether there has been a move from a “market citizen,” that is,
one whose rights flow from economic activity, to a “social
citizen,” whose citizenship is largely independent of engagement
in a particular activity in order to secure rights.96 Dougan
observes of the case law developments:
94. See Dep’t of Work & Pensions, Pension Credit, Income Support, Income Based
Employment and Support Allowance and Income-based Jobseeker's Allowance,
http://www.dwp.gov.uk/international/benefits/pension-credit-income-support
(last
visited June 29, 2010).
95. See Sec’y of State for Work & Pensions v. Dias, [2009] EWCA (Civ) 807, [2010]
1 C.M.L.R. 112 (aspects of the interpretation of the Citizenship Directive and its
relationship with the repealed provisions); Sec’y of State for Work & Pensions v. Lassal,
[2009] EWCA (Civ) 157 (temporal aspects of acquiring permanent residence under the
Citizenship Directive); Teixeira v. London Borough of Lambeth, [2008] EWCA (Civ)
1088, [2009] H.L.R. 127 (the right to reside in order to care for children under the
Baumbast case); McCarthy v. Sec’y of State for the Home Dept., [2008] EWCA (Civ) 641
(reference referred to in the Dias case; the interpretation of the words “resided legally”
in the Citizenship Directive); London Borough of Harrow v. Ibrahim, [2008] EWCA
(Civ) 386. The ECJ references are London Borough of Harrow v. Ibrahim, Case C310/08 (ECJ Feb. 23, 2010) (not yet reported); Teixeira v. London Borough of
Lambeth, Case C-480/08 (ECJ Feb. 23, 2010) (not yet reported); Opinion of Advocate
General Trstenjak, Sec’y of State for Work & Pensions v. Lassal, Case C-162/09 (ECJ,
delivered May 11, 2010) (Court decision not yet issued); McCarthy v. Sec’y of State for
the Home Dept., Case C-434/09, (pending case); and Sec’y of State for Work & Pensions
v. Dias, Case C-325/09 (pending case).
96. See, e.g., ELSPETH GUILD, LEGAL ELEMENTS OF EUROPEAN IDENTITY: EU
CITIZENSHIP AND MIGRATION LAW (2005); JO SHAW, THE TRANSFORMATION OF
CITIZENSHIP IN THE EUROPEAN UNION (2007); Samantha Besson & André Utzingerm,
Introduction: Future Challenges of European Citizenship—Facing a Wide-Open Pandora’s Box,
13 EUR. L.J. 573, 573–90 (2007); Michael Dougan, The Constitutional Dimension to Case
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Most commentators seem agreed that the Court has
embarked on what is (in effect) an exercise in social
engineering: economically inactive migrant Union citizens
are entitled to claim membership of the national solidaristic
community, based on nothing more than the common bond
of Union citizenship, albeit subject to the idea that such
individuals cannot become an unreasonable burden upon
the public purse.97

Thus, we may conclude that there are two routes to securing
equality of treatment with nationals of the host Member State
prior to the acquisition of permanent residence in the host
Member State. The first route is to establish that the beneficiary
is economically active, or is deemed to continue to be
economically active, as, for example, when people move from
employment to vocational training connected with that
employment which will enhance their job prospects. In such
cases, that is enough to entitle the person to the benefits for
which the Citizenship Directive provides. The alternative route is
to establish a sufficient degree of social integration in the host
Member State that, regardless of any link with economic activity,
the principle of social solidarity requires that person to be
treated equally with nationals of the host Member State.98 Those
are two radically different routes to the securing of rights under
European Union law.
IV. CONSEQUENTIAL ISSUES
A. The Continuing Significance of the Free Movement of Workers
Despite the constituionalizing effect of judgments of the ECJ
both in relation to rights of free movement flowing from
Law on Union Citizenship, 31 EUR. L. REV. 613, 613–41 (2006); Michelle Everson, The
Legacy of the Market Citizen, in NEW LEGAL DYNAMICS OF THE EUROPEAN UNION 73–90 (Jo
Shaw & Gillian More eds., 1995); Kay Hailbronner, Union Citizenship and Access to Social
Benefits, 42 COMMON MKT. L. REV. 1245, 1245–67 (2005); Christine Jacqueson, Union
Citizenship and the Court of Justice: Something New Under the Sun? Towards Social Citizenship,
27 EUR. L. REV. 260, 260–81 (2002).
97. Dougan, supra note 96, at 622.
98. For a somewhat pessimistic view of these developments, see generally Michael
Dougan, The Spatial Restructuring of National Welfare States within the European Union: The
Contribution of Citizenship and the Relevance of the Treaty of Lisbon, in INTEGRATING
WELFARE FUNCTIONS INTO EU LAW—FROM ROME TO LISBON 147, 147–87 (Ulla
Neergaard et al. eds., 2009).
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economic activity and solely as an incident of citizenship of the
Union, the freedom from immigration control enjoyed by
nationals of the Member States is essentially conditional until a
right of permanent residence is acquired after five years of
continuous and lawful residence.99 The right to permanent
residence can, however, be lost as a result of absence from the
host Member State for a period exceeding two consecutive
years.100 Under the Citizenship Directive, the right to enter and
reside has three distinct phases: (a) the initial three months; (b)
residence for more than three months; and (c) acquisition of a
right of permanent residence.101
The right to enter and reside for up to three months is
unconditional, but during this time, the migrant has very little
entitlement to assistance from the host Member State. Under
article 7 of the Citizenship Directive, residence for more than
three months is conditional on the person establishing that he or
she is (1) a worker or self-employed person; (2) a person of
independent means with comprehensive sickness insurance
coverage in the host Member State; or (3) a student with
comprehensive sickness insurance coverage in the host Member
State and a realistic expectation that he or she has sufficient
resources to avoid becoming a burden on the social assistance
system of the host Member State.102
Article 24(1) of the Citizenship Directive contains the
expression of the principle of equal treatment found in article 18
TFEU103 by providing that “all Union citizens residing on the
basis of this Directive in the territory of the host Member State
shall enjoy equal treatment with the nationals of that Member
State within the scope of the Treaty.”104 However, there is a
derogation from this requirement in article 24(2) of the
Citizenship Directive, which provides that the principle of equal
treatment does not extend to an entitlement to social assistance
99. This exposition focuses on the right of the person moving to enter and reside,
but there are also extensive rights for family members to accompany the “primary”
mover.
100. Citizenship Directive, No. 2004/38, art. 16(4), 2004 O.J. L 229, at 43.
101. Id. arts. 6–7, 16, 2005 O.J. L 197/34, at 39–40.
102. Id. art. 7, 2005 O.J. L 197/34, at 40.
103. TFEU, supra note 6, art. 18, 2008 O.J. C 115/47, at 56; EC Treaty, supra note 6,
art. 12, 2006 O.J. C 321 E, at 43.
104. Citizenship Directive, No. 2004/38, art. 24(1), 2004 O.J. L 229, at 45.
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within the first three months of residence, nor to an entitlement
to financial assistance for studies until a person has acquired
permanent residence.105 This leaves a lengthy period between the
three months’ residence and the acquisition of permanent
residence during which entitlement to equal treatment is
unclear. Such entitlement would appear to arise only when a
person’s residence falls within the specific requirements of article
7 of the Citizenship Directive.106 For those whose residence is
initially based upon being a worker, this brings sharply into play
the circumstances in which worker status will be lost, but the
person wishes to remain resident in the host Member State.
Article 7(3) of the Citizenship Directive deals with some
common situations. First, temporary inability to work as a result
of illness or accident does not result in the loss of worker
status.107 Second, involuntary unemployment arising after a
person has been employed for at least a year, where it is “duly
recorded,” and where the person has registered as a job-seeker
with an employment office, does not result in the loss of worker
status.108 Third, worker status is extended for at least six months
when a person is involuntarily unemployed on the ending of
fixed-term employment, or during the first twelve months of
employment. Furthermore, the unemployment must be “duly
recorded” and the person must be registered as a job-seeker with
an employment office.109 Finally, worker status is retained where
the person embarks on vocational training, provided that the
training is related to the previous employment.110 The proviso
does not apply if the vocational training follows involuntary
unemployment;111 presumably, the rationale is that the person is
training for alternative employment. Difficulties can arise in
Member States like the United Kingdom where there is no
obvious procedure directly linked to recording unemployment as
being involuntary.112
105. Id. art. 24(2), 2004 O.J. L 229, at 45.
106. Id. art. 7(3)(b), 2004 O.J. L 229, at 39.
107. Id. art. 7(3)(a), 2004 O.J. L 229, at 40.
108. Id. art. 7(3)(b), 2004 O.J. L 229, at 40.
109. Id. art. 7(3)(c), 2004 O.J. L 229, at 40.
110. Id. art. 7(3)(d), 2004 O.J. L 229, at 40.
111. Id.
112. Whether a person is voluntarily or involuntarily unemployed can be an issue
in relation to the conditions of entitlement to a United Kingdom unemployment
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All this indicates that worker status is central to a person’s
right to continue to reside in a Member State other than that of
his or her own nationality. That, in turn, means that the
European Union law definitions of employment (and, indeed,
self-employment) retain a centrality in European Union law
which casts back to the authorities of the ECJ established when
Gordon Slynn was Advocate General. There have, of course, been
glosses and additions to the case law in the period since the late
1980s, but the foundations had already been laid by then. In all
the talk of the constitutionalizing effect of the case law that has
touched on citizenship of the Union, it should not be forgotten
that the free movement of workers is part of one of the four
fundamental freedoms113 which form the foundations of the
internal market at the heart of the Treaty on the Functioning of
the European Union.114
B.

Reverse Discrimination

Reference has been made earlier in this Essay to the
principle of “reverse discrimination” under which European
Union rights do not accrue unless there is some factor linking
the situation to one contemplated by the Union treaties.115 The
result has been that, where the matters in dispute arise wholly
within a particular Member State, no reliance can be placed
upon European Union rights where they are greater than those
accorded in the national legal order. Has this principle been
affected by the introduction of citizenship of the Union? After
all, if all nationals of the Member States are thereby citizens of
the Union, why should one not be able to rely upon European
Union rights merely by virtue of holding that European Union
citizenship? In the Schempp case, the ECJ provided a simple
answer to this question: “However, it also follows from the caselaw that citizenship of the Union, established by Article 17 EC, is

benefit, but the issue arises in the context of considering a claim for benefit and not as a
matter of recording the circumstances in which the person became unemployed.
113. The four fundamental freedoms are the free movement of goods, persons,
services, and capital.
114. See, e.g., Petersen v. Arbeitsmarktservice Niederösterrreich, Case C-228/07,
[2008] E.C.R. I-6989, ¶¶ 43–51.
115. See supra notes 37–38 and accompanying text.
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not intended to extend the material scope of the Treaty to
internal situations which have no link with Community law.”116
So simple a statement disguises the way in which the ECJ
now determines whether a situation is “wholly internal” to a
Member State. Schempp concerned a German national who lived
in Germany.117 He was complaining about the tax treatment of
maintenance payments that he made to his ex-wife who, at the
material time, lived in Austria.118 The ECJ concluded that these
circumstances meant that Schempp’s complaint about the
German tax treatment of his maintenance payments was not a
matter wholly internal to Germany. Because his ex-wife had
exercised her rights to move to another Member State, the
implications for the tax treatment of maintenance payments was
enough to extend the matter beyond being purely internal to
Germany.119
C. Interdependencies and Inter-Relationships
The development of rights attaching to citizenship of the
Union raises questions of the interdependency of national
citizenship and Union citizenship. While it is logical to suggest
that citizenship of the Union enables such citizens to take a
bundle of European Union law rights into Member States of
which they are not nationals, the treaty basis for citizenship of the
Union provides for certain restrictions on such rights.120 It
subjects them to the conditions laid down in the treaty and to
provisions in the secondary legislation of the European Union.
Besson and Utzinger pertinently observe:
This reservation refers in particular to the legitimate interest
of Member States to require social and financial coverage
before granting the permission to reside legally, in order to
116. Schempp v. Finanzamt München V, Case C-403/03, [2005] E.C.R. I-3171, ¶ 20
(citing Land Nordhein-Westfalen v. Uecker, Joined Cases C-64–65/96, [1997] I-3171, ¶
23, and Garcia Avello v. Belgium, Case C-148/02, [2003] I-11,613, ¶ 26).
117. Id. ¶ 7.
118. Id. ¶¶ 8–10.
119. Id. ¶¶ 22–25. For examples of cases where the connection to European Union
law was accepted in the particular factual situations before the Court of Justice, and
which might not have been so decided prior to the introduction of citizenship of the
Union, see Zhu v. Sec’y of State for the Home Dept., Case C-200/02, [2004] E.C.R. I9925, and Garcia Avello v. Belgium Case C-148/02, [2003] E.C.R. I-11,613.
120. TFEU, supra note 6, art. 20, 2008 O.J. C 115, at 57.
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protect their public resources. By analogy, these inherent
Treaty-based limitations apply to all other EU citizenship
rights, which by definition are rights granted by the Treaty
and hence are limited according to the Treaty. This has, per
se, always been an object of concern since it subjects EU
citizenship rights to limitations one may accept in relation to
fundamental economic freedoms but not pertaining to other
social and political citizenship rights.121

There is also an important inter-relationship between
reliance on economic activity both to move and to secure certain
rights in the host Member State, and reliance on the citizenship
route to enter and reside in another Member State. For the
economically active, there is a presumption that they will not be a
burden on the host Member State, but in certain circumstances
that eventually may arise during that grey period between
residence beyond three months and the acquisition of
permanent residence. Their economic activity opens up access to
benefits which are not available for a “citizenship migrant,”
including access to income-related benefits. It is for this reason
that the free movement of workers, as part of one of the four
fundamental freedoms, remains as significant today as it was
when Gordon Slynn, as Advocate General, suggested solutions to
the ECJ on basic questions relating to the interpretation of what
was then article 48 of the EEC Treaty.
CONCLUSION
Despite the introduction of citizenship of the Union and its
significant influence on the case law dealing with rights to enter
and reside in a Member State other than that of a person’s own
nationality, there still exists a system of rights which is markedly
hierarchical. European Union migration law, like many national
migration laws, favors the well-off over those of more limited
means. However, the ability to move as an economically active
migrant free from immigration control now offers the
opportunity to secure permanent residence in another Member
State with guarantees of equal treatment in every respect with
nationals of the host Member State. Not requiring a work permit
or any other form of permission to enter and reside as a worker,
121. Besson & Utzinger, supra note 96, at 587.
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and to remain as a worker (even when not actually working)
provides distinct benefits that should not be dismissed. But the
hierarchical nature of the rights contained in the Citizenship
Directive makes the definition of who is a worker and when that
status is retained still of considerable importance in European
Union law. These issues, from time to time, bring national legal
orders into conflict with European Union law. The current
battleground relates to various benefits which would be available
to nationals in similar situations, but which are denied to
nationals of other Member States on the grounds that they have
lost a favored status under the European Union rules, and must
now fall back on their own resources rather than those of the
State. This, in turn, suggests that levels of social solidarity among
the Member States are still relatively undeveloped. Member
States still tend to see themselves as having a higher responsibility
to look after their own nationals than nationals of other Member
States who fall on hard times while resident in the host Member
State.

